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McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Erick Oliva-Ramos petitions for review of an order of 
the Board of Immigration  Appeals affirming an Immigration 
Judge‘s order removing him to Guatemala.  He also seeks 
review of the BIA‘s denial of his motion to supplement the 
record and to reopen his removal proceeding before an 
Immigration Judge.
1
  We must decide whether the BIA erred 
in refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in a removal 
proceeding under the circumstances in this case.  A related 
question that we must address is whether the BIA abused its 
                                              
1
 We consolidated the petition for review of the BIA‘s denial 
of his motion to reopen with our review of the underlying 
removal order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6). 
  3 
discretion in not reopening this case to allow Oliva-Ramos to 
supplement the administrative record with evidence of 
widespread and/or egregious conduct by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (―ICE‖) officials.  Finally, we must 
determine if alleged violations of regulations entitle Oliva-
Ramos to relief.  For the reasons explained below, we will 
grant the petitions, vacate the BIA‘s order of removal, and 
remand to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.
2
 
 
I. Factual Background 
 
At 4:30 a.m. on March 26, 2007, a team of armed, 
uniformed ICE officers repeatedly rang the entrance ―buzzer‖ 
to the Englewood, New Jersey apartment where Erick Oliva-
Ramos lived.  Oliva-Ramos shared the home with his three 
sisters (Clara, Wendy, and Maria), his nephew (Wagner), and 
his brother-in-law (Marvin).  Two visiting family friends 
were also in the apartment.  Of those present, only Clara 
could prove that she was legally in the United States. 
 
 According to the affidavit that was introduced at 
Oliva-Ramos‘s removal hearing,  Clara heard the incessant 
buzzing, but could not tell who was ringing the bell because 
the intercom was broken.
3
  Since it was 4:30 a.m., she 
                                              
2
 The BIA granted Oliva-Ramos‘s request for voluntary 
departure but that order automatically terminated upon the 
filing of the motion to reopen and the petition for review, and 
the alternate order of removal immediately took effect.  
Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 255 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citing 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f)). 
3
 The IJ noted that although Oliva-Ramos submitted affidavits 
from Clara, Marvin, and Wagner, those family members were 
―not present in court and unavailable for cross-examination 
by the Department of Homeland Security.‖  The  IJ ―weighed 
[these] document[s] accordingly.‖  The IJ considered the 
affidavit of Clara Oliva to the extent that it corroborated the 
testimony of the Government‘s witness on consent to enter 
the home, but did not explicitly state additional credibility 
determinations as to the weight of affidavits from family 
members not present at the suppression hearing.   
  4 
remotely opened the building‘s entry door because she feared 
that the repeated buzzing signaled an emergency.  While in 
her pajamas, she stepped onto the landing outside her 
apartment as she held her apartment door open with her foot 
and saw five or six ICE officers coming up the stairs.   
  
 As the officers approached the front door of the 
apartment, they waived an administrative warrant for Oliva-
Ramos‘s other sister, Maria.  Clara later stated that she 
realized that the people coming up the stairs were ICE agents 
when they said they had an order to arrest Maria.  The 
officers had no information about the identity or legal status 
of any of the other occupants of the apartment.  Before 
entering the apartment, the officers asked Clara for her name 
and immigration status, and she informed them that she was a 
legal permanent resident.  The officers then asked if Clara 
lived in the apartment and asked permission to enter.  In her 
affidavit, Clara explained that she did not deny entry even 
though Maria was not there because she (Clara) believed that 
she could not refuse and that the order to arrest Maria gave 
the officers the right to enter even in Maria‘s absence.  
 
At some point during the exchange with the officers, 
Clara lost her foothold on the open door and it slammed shut, 
leaving her outside the apartment.  Her son let her in, 
however, after she banged on the door.  As she entered, the 
officers lined up behind her and followed her inside.  Once 
inside, they began waking the occupants and ordering them 
into the living room while another agent blocked the door so 
that no one could leave.  
 
According to Oliva-Ramos‘s affidavit and testimony 
before the IJ, Clara knocked on his bedroom door and told 
him that immigration officers were there.  Oliva-Ramos 
shared his bedroom with his sister, Wendy, and her husband.  
Oliva-Ramos was sleeping, but Wendy opened the bedroom 
door.
4
   
 
                                              
4
 Since it was before dawn, the bedroom lights were turned 
off.   
  5 
An armed officer in a green ICE uniform shone a 
flashlight into the room and ordered everyone to move to the 
living room.  Oliva-Ramos was in his pajamas but was 
permitted to get dressed under the supervision of an ICE 
officer.  He testified that ―there was no way [he] could have 
left‖ the presence of the officers.  
 
The officer then directed Oliva-Ramos to the living 
room and told him to sit down.  In addition, Oliva-Ramos 
testified that the officer did not identify himself, show him a 
badge or identification, or tell him why he (the officer) was in 
the apartment.  During the removal hearing, Oliva-Ramos 
also testified that he was not told that he could refuse to go 
with the officer.
5
 
 
  After everyone was escorted to the living room, five 
or six armed ICE officers began questioning everyone about 
Maria.  During that questioning, the officers blocked each 
entrance to the living room.  Oliva-Ramos testified that he 
heard an officer tell Clara to sit down when she tried to stand.  
He also said he heard the officer tell her that if she did not sit, 
she could be arrested.  The officers asked about the identities 
and nationalities of all of the apartment occupants.  Clara‘s 
son, Wagner, initially refused to answer questions, but 
relented when the officers ordered him to speak and told him 
he could not refuse to answer them.   
 
The officers did not ask Oliva-Ramos any questions in 
the living room but ordered him back to his bedroom to 
retrieve his identification documents.  An officer followed 
Oliva-Ramos to the bedroom as he retrieved his identification 
and escorted him back to the living room.  Oliva-Ramos 
stated that he went to retrieve his documents because he 
thought that, if he did not go, he could be arrested because he 
did not have papers.  He also thought that if he showed his 
Guatemalan identification to the officer, nothing would 
happen.  The documents he retrieved revealed that he is a 
citizen of Guatemala; he was unable to produce any 
                                              
5
 Oliva-Ramos testified that he was nervous and that an 
officer followed him from the bedroom to the living room.  
 
  6 
documentation demonstrating that he was lawfully present in 
the United States. 
The encounter lasted approximately forty-five minutes.  
During that time, Oliva-Ramos and his family were prevented 
from eating, drinking, or speaking out of turn.  According to 
Clara‘s affidavit, her sister (Wendy) began menstruating 
while the family was in the living room, but Clara was not 
allowed to get any feminine hygiene products for her.  
According to Oliva-Ramos‘s affidavit, although Wendy and 
Oliva-Ramos were eventually allowed to use the bathroom, 
they had to leave the door open while an ICE officer stood 
outside the door, thus denying them the most rudimentary 
considerations of privacy.   
 
Clara was able to document that she was legally in the 
United States.  All others were eventually handcuffed, placed 
in an ICE van and driven around while the officers made 
several more raids.  At each stop, the agents followed a 
similar pattern of knocking on doors and making general 
inquiries about the legal status of all of the occupants in a 
residence.  These stops resulted in two more individuals being 
placed in the van.   
 
At around 7:00 a.m., Oliva-Ramos and his family 
arrived at the ICE office, where they were placed in a 
detention room containing an open toilet.  Oliva-Ramos 
testified that there he was told to fill out papers written in 
Spanish, and he was given the option of signing them.  He 
had to wait until the afternoon before he was questioned.
6
  He 
claims that neither he nor his relatives were given food nor 
water in the interim.  The ICE officers who conducted the 
raid eventually interviewed the detainees.  Oliva-Ramos was 
interviewed by ICE Officer Marlene Belluardo.  After being 
interviewed, Oliva-Ramos was charged with being removable 
and was taken to a detention facility.  While there, he was 
informed of his right to a lawyer and given a list of free legal 
service providers.  Between 6:00 and 7:00 p.m., he was 
finally given the first food that he had been allowed to eat 
during his 15-hour ordeal. 
                                              
6
 He stated that he was not told that he had a right to remain 
silent or that his answers could be used against him in a court 
of law.   
  7 
 
A. Immigration Court Proceedings 
During the ensuing removal proceedings, Oliva-Ramos 
testified on his own behalf with the assistance of a Spanish 
interpreter.  He was cross-examined about the raid, his arrest, 
and his examination at the ICE office.  He also presented the 
supporting affidavits of Clara, Wagner, and Marvin, although 
they were not present in court to testify.   
 
The Government presented only one witness, the 
arresting and interviewing ICE officer, Marlene Belluardo.  
Officer Belluardo testified that she had taken part in 
―hundreds‖ of home raids since participating in the raid at 
Oliva-Ramos‘s apartment on March 26, 2007, but had no 
independent recollection of the raid that led to Oliva-Ramos‘s 
detention.  Officer Belluardo stated that she does not 
remember anything about the apprehension, but 
acknowledged her participation based upon having filled out 
Form I-213, the Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, 
which listed her as an arresting officer.
7
  She testified about 
the general procedures used in ICE field operations, but her 
only knowledge of Oliva-Ramos came from the I-213 form.  
Officer Belluardo recognized him from the picture contained 
on the I-213 form.  She testified that she received three 
months‘ training on how to conduct investigative work, how 
to look for subjects with warrants, and about the confines of 
the Fourth Amendment.   
 
Belluardo also testified about the standard protocol for 
fugitive operations.  She said that when she goes to a home 
with a warrant, it is a ―knock warrant,‖ which is an 
administrative warrant.  Someone has to respond to her knock 
on the door and grant permission to enter, as an officer is only 
permitted to enter with permission.  Officer Belluardo 
confirmed that there was no warrant for Oliva-Ramos but 
only a deportation warrant for Maria.  Belluardo testified that 
it is standard protocol to get everyone in the house to a central 
location so that the officers can identify the subject and 
anyone else in the house.  In addition, she testified that 
everyone is brought into the living room as a central area of 
safety for everyone in the house.  Each person is asked his or 
                                              
7
  Three officers were listed as arresting officers.  
  8 
her identity, and any person found to be in the United States 
without documents or with questionable documents is taken 
into custody.  Finally, Officer Belluardo testified that, when 
apprehending a suspect, questions asked are usually just to 
identify the person and that no other questions are asked until 
they are taken into custody and transported to the processing 
area.  
 
The Government also presented the following four 
documents to support its charge of removability:  Form I-213, 
the Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien; Form I-215B, 
the affidavit of Erick Oliva-Ramos; the face page of a 
Guatemalan passport; and a Guatemalan consular 
identification card.  Oliva-Ramos objected to that evidence 
and moved to preclude consideration of all of the 
Government‘s evidence obtained during the raid of his 
apartment and his subsequent arrest.  He argued that the 
evidence had been obtained by exploiting violations of the 
Fourth Amendment that were both egregious and widespread, 
and thus the exclusionary rule should apply.  He also moved 
to terminate the proceedings, and requested an evidentiary 
hearing on his suppression motion. 
 
The Immigration Judge denied the motion to suppress 
and the motion to terminate the proceedings.  As a threshold 
matter, the IJ noted that the Government did not dispute that 
Oliva-Ramos had been detained without a warrant.  However, 
the IJ cited to BIA authority that had relied on INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), wherein the BIA had stated: 
―[E]ven assuming a warrantless arrest, the exclusionary rule, 
which requires a court to suppress evidence that is the fruit of 
an unlawful arrest or of other official conduct that violates the 
[F]ourth [A]mendment, does not apply in deportation 
proceedings.‖  The IJ concluded that ―[i]n removal 
proceedings . . . an alien cannot generally suppress evidence 
asserted to be procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
unless the alleged violation(s) are so egregious as to 
‗transgress notions of fundamental fairness.‘‖  (citing Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51). 
 
In rejecting Oliva-Ramos‘s argument that the 
Government had entered his home without valid consent in 
violation of 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) (2008), the IJ relied on the 
  9 
Government‘s assertion that ―consent was obtained prior to 
immigration officers entering the Respondent‘s residence 
from a ‗person in control of the site to be inspected,‘ namely, 
the Respondent‘s sister, Clara Oliva.‖8  The IJ explained:  
―[T]he I-213 clearly indicates that consent to enter the 
residence was obtained from Clara Oliva, and that ICE had a 
warrant for Maria Oliva at that address.‖  In weighing the 
testimony, the IJ noted that ―Ms. Belluardo testified that she 
ha[d] no independent recollection of the specific events of 
Respondent‘s detention, and her testimony is based on the 
facts as documented in the I-213 which she prepared in the 
ordinary course of business immediately following the 
Respondent‘s detention.‖  The IJ also relied on Officer 
Belluardo‘s testimony that ―obtaining consent prior to entry is 
consistent with training ICE officers, including her, receive in 
the course of employment with DHS.‖  In addition, the IJ 
stated that Oliva-Ramos‘s testimony, and his sister Clara 
Oliva‘s affidavit, were consistent with the testimony of 
Officer Belluardo and the I-213.  Thus, the IJ found that 
―consent to enter the residence at 97A Palisade Avenue was 
properly obtained prior to ICE officers‘ entry into the 
                                              
8
 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) states in relevant part: ―An 
immigration officer may not enter into the non-public areas of 
a . . . residence including the curtilage of such residence, . . .  
except as provided in section 287(a)(3) of the Act, for the 
purpose of questioning the occupants . . . concerning their 
right to be . . . in the United States unless the officer has 
either a warrant or the consent of the owner or other person in 
control of the site to be inspected.‖  
 The referenced exception found in Section 287(a)(3) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act relates to border searches.  8 
U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3), 66 Stat. 233, INA § 287(a)(3) (2006) 
(―Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under 
regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have 
power without warrant-- . . . within a reasonable distance 
from any external boundary of the United States, to board and 
search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the 
United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or 
vehicle, and within a distance of twenty-five miles from any 
such external boundary to have access to private lands, but 
not dwellings, for the purpose of patrolling the border to 
prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the United States.‖).   
  10 
residence.‖  The IJ did not, however, evaluate any of the 
evidence relevant to whether circumstances might have 
existed to invalidate the alleged ―consent‖ or to determine if 
the circumstances here implicated the exception to the 
nonapplication of the exclusionary rule in removal 
proceedings under Lopez-Mendoza that we discuss in detail 
below. 
 
Moreover, the IJ ruled that the documents Oliva-
Ramos sought to suppress were contained in what is known 
as an ―A‖ file.  The IJ relied upon United States v. Herrera-
Ochoa, 245 F.3d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 2001), in asserting that an 
alien maintains no legitimate expectation of privacy in that 
file, and therefore lacks standing to challenge its introduction 
into evidence.   
 
Oliva-Ramos also sought to subpoena testimony of the 
additional ICE officers who were involved in his seizure as 
well as certain documents that the Government had not 
produced pursuant to Oliva-Ramos‘s Freedom of Information 
Act request (―FOIA‖).9  Specifically, Oliva-Ramos sought the 
production of documents related to the search and seizure of 
his home and arrest, training manuals and documentation of 
the ICE Fugitive Operation Task Force, relevant ICE policy 
and procedures, and records related to the ICE officers who 
arrested him.  In addition, Oliva-Ramos moved to subpoena 
the ICE officers who participated in his arrest.  Although the 
IJ indicated that she wanted to address the subpoenas at an 
individual merits hearing, she never ruled on the motion to 
subpoena the additional documents and witnesses. 
 
At a later hearing on removability, the IJ found Oliva-
Ramos removable as charged but granted his request for 
voluntary departure.  Oliva-Ramos then appealed to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals.   
 
B. Board of Immigration Appeals Proceedings  
 
The BIA first considered Oliva-Ramos‘s Fourth 
Amendment claim that the Government had obtained 
evidence of alienage without proper consent through coercion 
                                              
9
 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). 
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and duress during the raid of his home.  The BIA declined to 
address the claim as presented and cited to Lopez-Mendoza, 
explaining that ―the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is 
generally not applicable in civil removal proceedings.‖  In a 
lengthy footnote, the BIA acknowledged the following 
language in Lopez-Mendoza on which Oliva-Ramos based his 
Fourth Amendment claim:  
 
We are mindful that [in Lopez-Mendoza] a 
plurality of the United States Supreme Court 
opined that, in removal proceedings, ―egregious 
violations of the Fourth Amendment or other 
liberties that might transgress notions of 
fundamental fairness and undermine the 
probative value of the evidence‖ might 
potentially warrant a reconsideration of the 
exclusionary rule‘s role in civil removal 
proceedings.  INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, at 
1050-51. . . .  Further, as the respondent makes 
the argument that the DHS engages in 
―widespread‖ violations of the Fourth 
Amendment (Respondent‘s Br. at 42), we 
acknowledge that the Supreme Court provided 
for the prospective contingency that its 
―conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule‘s 
value might change, if there developed good 
reason to believe that Fourth Amendment 
violations by INS officers were widespread.‖  
Id. at 1050.  (citation omitted).  However, first, 
these comments from a plurality of the Supreme 
Court are obiter dictum; second, no such ―good 
reason to believe‖ has yet arisen in the eyes of 
the Supreme Court; and, third, our own 
precedents, by which we are bound, recognize 
no such exception to the inapplicability of the 
exclusionary rule premised on widespread 
Fourth Amendment violations . . . . 
 
The BIA also acknowledged that its precedential decisions 
―have provided for the exclusion of evidence against an alien 
in ‗fundamentally unfair‘ circumstances.‖  The Board then 
noted that ―this principle of fundamental fairness is rooted in 
notions of due process of law, not in the Fourth Amendment 
  12 
exclusionary rule.‖  Thus, to the extent that the Board 
considered Oliva-Ramos‘s argument at all, it did so ―in terms 
of due process requirements.‖ 
  
 The BIA found that the Government had satisfied its 
initial burden of establishing alienage through the evidence 
that Oliva-Ramos sought to suppress, including the Form I-
213 and Form I-215B, as well as his Guatemalan passport and 
identification card.  The BIA also concluded that Oliva-
Ramos had not rebutted that evidence prior to receiving a 
grant of voluntary departure.  The BIA did not believe that 
any regulatory violations altered the outcome because the 
documents the Government presented ―[were] inherently 
reliable and were not shown to have been created under 
impermissible coercion and duress.‖ 
  
 The BIA then considered Oliva-Ramos‘s challenges to 
certain administrative regulations governing ICE conduct.  
First, it considered Oliva-Ramos‘s coercion claim that the 
Government impermissibly threatened and coerced him when 
it inspected the non-public, interior areas of his residence, in 
violation of 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2).
10
  The BIA cited to the 
IJ‘s finding ―that the DHS first obtained the consent of one of 
the respondent‘s familial cohabitants before entering the 
premises.‖  Since the BIA did not believe that the conclusion 
was clearly erroneous, the BIA relied upon that finding when 
considering all of Oliva-Ramos‘s claims.11   
 
                                              
10
 The BIA relied on Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 180 
(3d Cir. 2010), for the principle that ―when an agency 
promulgates a regulation protecting fundamental statutory or 
constitutional rights of parties appearing before it, the agency 
must comply with that regulation.  Failure to comply will 
merit invalidation of the challenged agency action without 
regard to whether the alleged violation has substantially 
prejudiced the complaining party.‖ 
11
 The BIA also stated that it independently ―considered the 
respondent‘s asserted bases for contending that the consent to 
the officers‘ entry was coerced (or otherwise invalid) but 
[was] not persuaded by them.‖  
  13 
Second, Oliva-Ramos claimed that the Government 
had violated 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(1) by impermissibly 
restraining his freedom through threats and coercion during 
the inspection and investigation of his home.  However, the 
BIA reasoned that INA § 287(a)(1), the statute under which § 
287.8(b)(1) was promulgated, permits warrantless 
interrogation if ICE officers reasonably believe that a person 
may be unlawfully in the United States.  The BIA concluded 
that requirement was satisfied once Oliva-Ramos presented 
his Guatemalan passport and identification.  The BIA also 
relied on Oliva-Ramos‘s own testimony before the IJ that he 
had no intention of leaving the apartment because he ―didn‘t 
commit any crime.‖  During the hearing before the IJ, he had 
been asked: ―[W]hat would have happened if you‘d asked the 
officers to leave?‖  He responded, ―I couldn‘t tell the officers 
to leave because it‘s the law and I didn‘t have anything to tell 
them.‖ 
  
 Third, Oliva-Ramos argued that the Government 
violated 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i) when it arrested him 
without first obtaining a warrant.  The BIA rejected that claim 
because INA § 287(a)(2) specifically authorizes warrantless 
arrests where ICE officers have reason to believe that 
someone is here in the United States illegally and poses a risk 
of flight if not detained.  See also 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii).  
The I-213 stated:  ―A field interview revealed that the subject 
was an alien unlawfully present in the United States and he 
was arrested without a warrant in that he appeared to be a 
flight risk.‖ 
  
 The BIA also rejected Oliva-Ramos‘s claims that 
regulatory violations that did not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment entitled him to relief.  The BIA did not believe 
that Oliva-Ramos had established a violation of 8 C.F.R. §§ 
287.3(c) or 292.5(b) because he had been properly advised as 
required before formal removal proceedings were initiated.
12
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 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c) provides in relevant part:  
[A]n alien arrested without warrant and placed 
in formal proceedings . . .  will be advised of the 
reasons for his or her arrest and the right to be 
represented at no expense to the Government. 
The examining officer will provide the alien 
  14 
The BIA also rejected Oliva-Ramos‘s argument that his 
examination by the same DHS officer who had arrested him 
in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a) entitled him to relief.  That 
regulation provides that ―[a]n alien arrested without a warrant 
. . . will be examined by an officer other than the arresting 
officer.‖13  
  
 The BIA similarly rejected Oliva-Ramos‘s final 
regulatory claim that DHS had violated 8 C.F.R. § 
287.8(d)(1) when it left him and his fellow detainees locked 
and unattended in a van several times during a two-hour 
                                                                                                     
with a list of the available free legal services 
provided by organizations and attorneys 
qualified . . .  that are located in the district 
where the hearing will be held.  The examining 
officer shall note on Form I–862 that such a list 
was provided to the alien.  The officer will also 
advise the alien that any statement made may be 
used against him or her in a subsequent 
proceeding. 
 
8. C.F.R. § 292.5(b) provides in relevant part: ―Whenever an 
examination is provided for in this chapter, the person 
involved shall have the right to be represented by an attorney 
or representative who shall be permitted to examine or cross-
examine such person and witnesses, to introduce evidence, to 
make objections . . .  and to submit briefs.‖ 
13
 The BIA held that this particular section requires a 
demonstration of prejudice, unlike several of the other 
regulatory provisions that do not require a showing of 
prejudice under Leslie.  The BIA did not reach the question of 
prejudice.  It concluded that Oliva-Ramos had not testified 
that he was arrested by the same agent who examined him 
after the arrest because he could not remember Officer 
Belluardo being present during the raid.  As discussed above, 
Officer Belluardo had no independent recollection of this 
particular home raid but conceded that she was likely present 
since she filled out the Form I-213 for the investigation of 
Oliva-Ramos‘s home. 
  15 
period while transporting them to the detention facility.
14
  The 
BIA rejected that contention because Oliva-Ramos had not 
established a regulatory violation.  He had not testified before 
the IJ about any periods of time when he was left in the van.  
The BIA noted that Oliva-Ramos had merely directed the IJ‘s 
attention to an affidavit drafted before the suppression 
hearing.
15
   
  
 The BIA then turned its attention to two allegations of 
misconduct by the IJ.  First, it considered Oliva-Ramos‘s 
allegation that a translator had improperly translated the 
Spanish word ―arma‖ into the English word ―arm‖ in the 
sense of a body part as opposed to an armament or firearm.  
The BIA found no due process violation because it concluded 
that ―the word was conscientiously translated and . . . all the 
parties present understood the respondent.‖  Second, Oliva-
Ramos alleged that the Immigration Judge demonstrated 
improper bias but the BIA found that the transcript of the 
hearing before the IJ reflected ―that the Immigration Judge 
conducted the sometimes contentious and inherently difficult 
proceedings fairly.‖  Thus, the BIA found no due process 
violations with respect to the IJ‘s conduct of the removal 
proceedings. 
 
Finally, the BIA considered a motion to remand the 
proceedings to the Immigration Judge to consider new 
evidence that was not presented to the IJ.  On February 18, 
2009, while his appeal was pending before the BIA, Oliva-
Ramos moved to present previously unavailable evidence of 
alleged widespread Fourth Amendment violations by ICE 
                                              
14
 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(d)(1) provides in relevant part: ―All 
persons will be transported in a manner that ensures the safety 
of the persons being transported. . . . The person being 
transported shall not be left unattended during transport 
unless the immigration officer needs to perform a law 
enforcement function.‖ 
15
 It appears that the BIA also required prejudice because it 
found that this alleged regulatory violation did not ―implicate 
fundamental statutory or constitutional rights at play in the 
respondent’s removal proceeding.‖ 
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officials.
16
  He stated that on October 4, 2007, he had 
requested many documents relating to the procedures 
employed by the Fugitive Operations Teams that conducted 
the raid of his home.  The Government had denied his FOIA 
request for these documents, citing FOIA Exemptions 2 and 
7(E).
17
  Oliva-Ramos only obtained that documentary 
evidence after proceedings before the Immigration Judge 
were finished.  The documents were finally obtained through 
a FOIA request and not made available until after the April 
suppression hearing and his initial appeal to the BIA.
18
  Those 
                                              
16
 In addition, Oliva-Ramos also sought to present additional 
evidence relating to the translator‘s interpretation of the word 
―arma‖ discussed above. 
17
 In denying his FOIA request, the Government explained: 
FOIA Exemption 2(high) protects information 
applicable to internal administrative and 
personnel matters, such as operating rules, 
guidelines, and manual of procedures of 
examiners or adjudicators, to the extent that 
disclosure would risk circumvention of an 
agency regulation or statute, impede the 
effectiveness of an agency‘s activities, or reveal 
sensitive information that may put the security 
and safety of an agency activity or employee at 
risk.  Whether there is any public interest in 
disclosure is legally irrelevant.  Rather, the 
concern under high 2 is that a FOIA disclosure 
should not benefit those attempting to violate 
the law and avoid detection.   
ICE Response to Oliva-Ramos‘s FOIA request, definition of 
FOIA Exemption 2 (high) (Feb. 19, 2008)).  The Government 
further explained that ―FOIA Exemption 7(E) protects records 
compiled for law enforcement purposes, the release of which 
could disclose techniques and/or procedures for law 
enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or could 
reasonably be expected to risk circumventions of the law.‖  
Id. (citing ICE Response to FOIA Request, definition of 
FOIA Exemption 7(E) (Feb. 19, 2008)). 
  17 
documents were attached as an exhibit to the motion to 
remand.  The motion included ICE memoranda regarding the 
Fugitive Operations Teams and ICE statistics on arrests.   
 
The ICE memorandum dated September 29, 2006 
changed the agency‘s policy with respect to achieving an 
arrest target of 1,000 ―fugitive aliens‖ per Fugitive Operations 
Team (―FOT‖) as previously established in an ICE 
memorandum dated January 31, 2006.  The January 
memorandum had specified that ―collateral arrests‖ would not 
be counted toward the goal of 1,000 arrests.  The September 
memorandum changed the policy to permit up to fifty percent 
of each team‘s arrest goal to be satisfied by counting 
―collateral arrests.‖  These are arrests of persons who were 
not themselves the targets of the FOT and had not missed 
removal hearings or departure deadlines, but were discovered 
during ICE operations.  In the following fiscal year, when 
Oliva-Ramos was detained by a FOT that was after someone 
else, collateral arrests comprised forty percent of the total 
number of ICE arrests by FOTs.  Collateral arrests accounted 
for nearly twenty-five percent of all FOTs arrests in fiscal 
year 2007.  Oliva-Ramos argued that he was detained 
pursuant to this policy, and that the policy both encouraged 
and resulted in widespread violations of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
However, the Board reasoned that remand was 
unwarranted because the BIA was not bound by the Lopez-
Mendoza plurality opinion.  As noted above, in Lopez-
Mendoza, the Court had recognized the possibility of the 
exclusionary rule applying to civil deportation proceedings 
based on widespread or egregious violations of the Fourth 
Amendment.  
 
Thus, the BIA dismissed the appeal, denied Oliva-
Ramos‘s motion to remand, and this petition for review 
followed. 
 
II. Standard of Review  
                                                                                                     
18
 He obtained the documents after the evidence was released 
to the public as a result of FOIA litigation by a professor at 
the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.  
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The BIA issued its own opinion. We therefore review 
its decision rather than that of the IJ.  Li v. Att’y. Gen., 400 
F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005).  Where the ―BIA‘s opinion 
directly states that the BIA is deferring to the IJ, or invokes 
specific aspects of the IJ‘s analysis and factfinding in support 
of the BIA‘s conclusions,‖ we review both the BIA and IJ 
decisions.  Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 
2005).   
 
We review the BIA‘s denial of a motion to reopen for 
abuse of discretion.  Luntungan v. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 551, 
555 (3d Cir. 2006).  ―Under the abuse of discretion standard, 
the Board‘s decision must be reversed if it is arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.‖  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 
166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
We review the BIA‘s conclusions of law such as ―whether the 
BIA applied the correct legal standard in considering the 
motion to reopen‖ and the underlying constitutional claims de 
novo.  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153-54 (3d Cir. 
2007).  
 
III. Discussion 
 
 We begin our analysis with a discussion of INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, as that case is central to our disposition of 
these petitions.  We then proceed to consider, in turn, Oliva-
Ramos‘s due process claims, Fourth Amendment claims, and 
claims predicated on various regulatory violations.    
 
A.  Lopez-Mendoza 
 
In INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), the 
Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule generally does 
not apply to removal proceedings.  The Court reached that 
conclusion after balancing the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule against the social cost of extending its 
application to civil removal proceedings.  However, a 
plurality of the Justices was careful to add the following 
qualifier to their discussion of that balancing:  
 
Our conclusions concerning the exclusionary 
rule‘s value might change, if there developed 
  19 
good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment 
violations by INS officers were widespread.  
Finally, we do not deal here with egregious 
violations of Fourth Amendment or other 
liberties that might transgress notions of 
fundamental fairness and undermine the 
probative value of the evidence obtained.  At 
issue here is the exclusion of credible evidence 
gathered in connection with peaceful arrests by 
INS officers. We hold that evidence derived 
from such arrests need not be suppressed in an 
INS civil deportation hearing. 
 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51 (footnote omitted) 
(internal citations omitted).   
 
In Lopez-Mendoza, two citizens of Mexico were 
ordered deported after separate immigration proceedings.  
INS agents arrested Lopez-Mendoza at his job without a 
warrant to search the jobsite or a warrant to arrest anyone 
there.  After the shop owner refused to permit the agents to 
speak with his employees during work hours, they devised  a 
scheme to distract the shop owner so that they could question 
his employees.  While he was being questioned, Lopez-
Mendoza told the agents that he was a citizen of Mexico, and 
that he had entered the United States without inspection by 
immigration authorities.   
 
In the proceedings that followed, Lopez-Mendoza 
argued that statements he made pursuant to his warrantless 
arrest should not have been admitted in his deportation 
proceedings.  The Court reasoned that officers who violated 
an arrestee‘s rights were already subject to civil liability, and 
that in civil deportation proceedings the exclusionary rule ―‗is 
unlikely to provide significant, much less substantial, 
additional deterrence.‘‖  Id. at 1046 (quoting United States v. 
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976)).  
 
Nevertheless, as we quoted above, a plurality of the 
Court allowed for the possibility of suppression in the case of 
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widespread or egregious violations of constitutional rights.
19
  
Four Justices dissented.  Each dissenting Justice believed that 
the exclusionary rule should generally apply in deportation 
proceedings.  Justice White disagreed with the result of the 
majority‘s balancing of the costs and benefits of applying the 
exclusionary rule in removal proceedings.  He would have 
applied the rule without the limitation imposed by the 
majority decision.  See 468 U.S. at 1052 (White, J., 
dissenting) (―I believe that the conclusion of the majority is 
based upon an incorrect assessment of the costs and benefits 
of applying the rule in [civil removal proceedings].‖).  Justice 
Brennan agreed, stating that ―I fully agree with Justice White 
that . . . the exclusionary rule must apply in civil deportation 
proceedings‖ not because it is a deterrent but because ―of the 
Fourth Amendment itself.‖  Id. at 1051 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Marshall also ―agree[d] with Justice 
White that . . . [precedent] compels the conclusion that the 
exclusionary rule should apply in civil deportation 
proceedings.‖  Id. at 1060 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  And, 
finally, Justice Stevens joined all of Justice White‘s dissent 
except for the latter‘s conclusion that the good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule should apply with equal force to 
warrantless immigration searches because the Court had yet 
to conclude that the good faith exception applied to 
warrantless searches generally.  Id. at 1061 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Thus, though technically correct to characterize 
the portion of the majority opinion recognizing a potential 
exception to the Court‘s holding as a ―plurality opinion,‖ 
eight Justices agreed that the exclusionary rule should apply 
in deportation/removal proceedings involving egregious or 
widespread Fourth Amendment violations.  Thus, where an 
alien can establish either of those two circumstances, the 
plurality opinion can only be read as affirming that the 
remedy of suppression justifies the social cost.
20
 
                                              
19
 While Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the portion of the 
opinion holding that the exclusionary rule generally did not 
apply in deportation proceedings, he did not join in the part of 
the opinion recognizing that egregious or widespread Fourth 
Amendment violations might warrant application of the 
exclusionary rule.   
20
 This is not surprising since, as Justice Brennan had 
explained, lawless disregard by police for the privacy 
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Thus, Lopez-Mendoza sanctions the application of the 
exclusionary rule in cases where constitutional violations by 
immigration officers are ―widespread‖ or evidence has been 
obtained as a result of ―egregious violations of Fourth 
Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of 
fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of 
the evidence obtained.‖  Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-
51.  With this rule in mind, we proceed to consider Oliva-
Ramos‘s claims. 
 
B. Due Process Claims 
 
We first consider Oliva-Ramos‘s claims that the IJ 
violated his right to due process by failing to rule on his 
pending motions to subpoena witnesses and documents and 
by declining to correct translation errors.  Oliva-Ramos also 
claims that the BIA denied him due process by declining to 
remand his case to the IJ to consider newly available evidence 
of egregious and/or widespread abuses.   
 
We are, of course, aware of the very valid concern 
expressed in Lopez-Mendoza that ―a deportation hearing is 
intended to provide a streamlined determination of eligibility 
to remain in this country. . . .‖  Id. at 1039.  Nevertheless, 
removal proceedings must comport with basic notions of due 
process.  Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Accordingly, concerns for brevity, efficiency and 
expedience must not be used to justify denying an alien the 
right to produce witnesses where that request is appropriate 
and the witnesses‘ presence appears necessary to satisfy basic 
notions of due process.  That is particularly true where the 
IJ‘s refusal to issue or enforce subpoenas is contrary to the 
very regulatory scheme governing the removal process.  
                                                                                                     
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment creates 
significant social costs that cannot be ignored.  See Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 524 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(―To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in 
the name of protecting society from law-breakers is to make 
the government itself lawless and to subvert those values 
upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend.‖) 
(footnote omitted). 
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Here, the IJ‘s refusal to grant the subpoenas is contrary 
to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.35(b).  Under that regulation, ―[a]n 
Immigration Judge may issue a subpoena upon his or her own 
volition or upon application of the Service or the alien.‖  Id. 
at § 1003.35(b)(1). When a party applies for a subpoena, the 
movant must ―state in writing or at the proceeding . . . what 
he or she expects to prove by such witnesses or documentary 
evidence, and . . .  show affirmatively that he or she has made 
diligent effort, without success to produce the same.‖  Id. at § 
1003.35(b)(2).  Although the regulation provides some 
discretion to an IJ, ―[u]pon being satisfied that a witness will 
not appear and testify or produce documentary evidence and 
that the witness‘ evidence is essential, the Immigration Judge 
shall issue a subpoena.‖  Id. at § 1003.35(b)(3) (emphasis 
added).  Given the circumstances here, we believe that the IJ 
abused her discretion in determining that the witnesses and 
documents were not essential.  Cf. Cuadras v. INS, 910 F.2d 
572, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (―[T]he IJ is not required to issue the 
subpoena unless she is satisfied that the evidence is 
‗essential.‘ 8 C.F.R. 287.4(a)(2)(ii)(C).  Since the IJ did not 
rely on the BHRHA report, he did not abuse his discretion in 
determining that the witnesses and documents were not 
essential.‖).   
 
As we explained above, during the removal 
proceedings before the IJ, Oliva-Ramos moved to subpoena 
documents related to the search and seizure of his home and 
arrest, documents relevant to the underlying policy for 
conducting such searches and seizures, including training 
manuals and documentation of ICE Fugitive Operation Task 
Force policy and procedures, and records related to the ICE 
officers who arrested him.  He also attempted to subpoena the 
other ICE officers who participated in his arrest.   
 
Oliva-Ramos satisfied both requirements of the 
regulation.  The requested witnesses and documents were 
essential to Oliva-Ramos‘s claim of egregious or widespread 
violations and alleged constitutional violations by the 
Government.  ICE policy and practice manuals on search and 
seizure practices and its practices with respect to consent and 
entry of dwellings could have shed light on the contested 
nature of Clara Oliva‘s consent, as well as whether Oliva-
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Ramos was improperly seized.  In addition, the testimony of 
additional officers who were present during the investigation 
and arrest of Oliva-Ramos could have been used to impeach 
the testimony of the Government‘s sole witness during the 
suppression hearing or to adduce additional facts that may 
have altered the analysis of alleged constitutional violations, 
including the nature of Clara‘s alleged consent.  Not allowing 
Oliva-Ramos to introduce this testimony is particularly 
problematic here because the only witness who testified for 
the Government could not recall Oliva-Ramos‘s seizure or 
any facts related to it.  Since the Government forced Oliva 
Ramos to litigate his FOIA request, it should have been clear 
to the IJ that, even though Oliva-Ramos had exercised 
diligence, he was not able to effectively present his case and 
that he was not attempting to delay or obfuscate the 
proceedings. 
 
We recognize that ―[o]ne who raises the claim 
questioning the legality of the evidence must come forward 
with proof establishing a prima facie case before the Service 
will be called on to assume the burden of justifying the 
manner in which it obtained the evidence.‖  Matter of 
Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (1988).  Oliva-Ramos 
attempted to meet his burden, but was thwarted by his 
inability to obtain the evidence and witnesses necessary to do 
so.  Only after the briefing before the BIA did the 
Government turn over the documents that Oliva-Ramos had 
tried to subpoena.    
 
As noted above, the Government had previously 
resisted that subpoena, and Oliva-Ramos appeared before the 
IJ without the benefit of those documents or the witnesses he 
had tried to subpoena.  He was finally able to obtain the 
documentary evidence only after members of a clinical 
program at the Cardozo School of Law initiated FOIA 
litigation. The documents thus obtained were attached to his 
motion to reopen and were clearly relevant to his burden of 
establishing whether any abuses were widespread and/or 
egregious.  Rather than tender a timely disclosure of such 
documents pursuant to the subpoena, the Government forced 
Oliva-Ramos to rely on a FOIA request to obtain documents 
that were in the exclusive custody and control of the 
Government and were clearly germane to his legal claims.  
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We do not suggest that the documents would have 
satisfied Oliva-Ramos‘s burden had the IJ or BIA reviewed 
them.  We only note that the documents certainly appeared 
relevant to Oliva-Ramos‘s legal claims, and there is nothing 
to suggest that they were sought in bad faith or to delay the 
proceedings. 
 
 Because the Immigration Judge never ruled on Oliva-
Ramos‘s motion to subpoena witnesses and documents, the 
BIA had no underlying order to review.  Thus, we will grant 
Oliva-Ramos‘s motion to reopen the proceedings in order to 
permit him to subpoena the additional witnesses and to 
introduce newly available documents, and will instruct the 
BIA to remand to the Immigration Judge in the event that 
additional evidentiary proceedings are appropriate.  
 
We will, however, affirm the BIA‘s ruling that errors 
in the transcript and related questioning did not deny Oliva-
Ramos the due process of law.  Any such errors were clarified 
and the record demonstrates that Olivia-Ramos fully 
understood the questions asked of him during his interview 
with Officer Belluardo.     
 
Inasmuch as we conclude the BIA abused its discretion 
in denying Oliva-Ramos‘s motion to reopen, we need not 
reach Oliva-Ramos‘s additional due process claims based on 
the conduct of the removal hearings.  
 
C. The Exclusionary Rule  
 
We now address the heart of Oliva-Ramos‘s petition.  
Oliva-Ramos argues that the BIA misapplied Fourth 
Amendment law when evaluating his various Fourth 
Amendment claims.  He claimed that the ICE agents failed to 
obtain proper consent to enter the apartment, that they 
arrested him without a warrant and without probable cause, 
and that they seized him without reasonable suspicion.  
Relying on Lopez-Mendoza, Oliva-Ramos contends that 
Fourth Amendment law provides for the suppression of 
evidence obtained as a result of these violations because they 
were egregious and/or widespread.  According to Oliva-
Ramos, the BIA erred in categorically rejecting all of Oliva-
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Ramos‘s Fourth Amendment arguments on the ground that 
the exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation 
proceedings, and thereby erred in failing to evaluate, first, 
whether ICE agents violated Oliva-Ramos‘s Fourth 
Amendment rights, and, second, whether those violations 
were egregious or widespread.  We agree.   
 
The BIA rejected Oliva-Ramos‘s reliance on Lopez-
Mendoza because it regarded the ―comments from a plurality 
of the Supreme Court [to be] obiter dictum.‖  The BIA 
explained that the Court had not yet found circumstances 
sufficient to apply the exclusionary rule in removal 
proceedings, and the Board‘s ―own precedents . . . recognize 
no such exception to the inapplicability of the exclusionary 
rule premised on widespread Fourth Amendment violations.‖  
There are several flaws in the BIA‘s approach.   
  
  The BIA leapfrogged over the serious concerns it 
should have addressed under Lopez-Mendoza about the 
manner in which the evidence was obtained here.  See 
Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234-35 (2d Cir. 
2006); United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 587 (6th 
Cir. 2005); Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 493 (9th Cir. 
1994); cf. United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 243 (3d Cir. 
2011) (―Typically, the exclusionary rule requires that we 
suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search.‖).   
  
 We must reject the BIA‘s reading of Lopez-Mendoza 
that would only permit suppression of evidence based on 
―fundamentally unfair‖ circumstances in violation of the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The BIA‘s analysis 
of Lopez-Mendoza views that opinion only as a plurality.  In 
doing so, the BIA ignored the fact that almost all of the 
Justices on the Court agreed that the exclusionary rule should 
apply to some extent in removal hearings.  As we explained 
above, eight of the nine Justices agreed with that proposition.  
Four would have limited the rule to instances of widespread 
or egregious violations of law by Government officials, and 
four others would apply the rule without that condition.  See 
Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 778 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(citing Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051-61 (Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting)); see also 
Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1448 n.2 (9th Cir. 
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1994) (same).   
  
 Moreover, even if the pronouncement in Lopez-
Mendoza was dicta as the BIA labeled it, Supreme Court dicta 
should not be so cavalierly cast aside.  See Official Committee 
of Unsecured Creditors v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d 
Cir. 2003) ( ―[W]e should not idly ignore considered 
statements the Supreme Court makes in dicta‖); see also 
Wroblewska v. Holder, 656 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2011)  
(―The Supreme Court has required a showing of ‗egregious 
violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might 
transgress notions of fundamental fairness‘ before the 
exclusionary rule will apply in immigration proceedings.  
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51.  It makes no difference 
that Wroblewska‘s argument is styled as a due-process 
argument rather than one based on the Fourth Amendment.‖).  
―Accordingly, it is reasonable to read Lopez-Mendoza as 
showing that eight Justices would have applied the 
exclusionary rule in circumstances where evidence was 
obtained through an ‗egregious‘ Fourth Amendment 
violation.‖  Puc-Ruiz, 629 F.3d at 778 n.2.  The fact that the 
Court has not yet applied the rule in a deportation proceeding 
cannot undermine the fact that the Court has allowed for that 
possibility.  The fact that the BIA believed its own precedents 
did not recognize the exception set out in Lopez-Mendoza can 
neither negate nor minimize the fact that the exception has 
been recognized by the Supreme Court.  
  
 Accordingly, we reiterate today that the exclusionary 
rule may apply in removal proceedings where an alien shows 
―egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties 
that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and 
undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.‖  
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051; see also United States v. 
Bowley, 435 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2006) (―The Court in 
Lopez-Mendoza was careful to qualify its broad statement by 
noting that it was not considering ‗egregious violations of 
Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress 
notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative 
value of the evidence obtained.‘‖). 
 
The BIA therefore erred in concluding that the 
discussion in Lopez-Mendoza lacked the force of law, and the 
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Board clearly failed to conduct the proper analysis to 
determine whether any such egregious violations occurred.  
The IJ and the Board should have, but did not, first determine 
whether agents violated Oliva-Ramos‘s Fourth Amendment 
rights and second, whether any such violations implicated the 
Lopez-Mendoza exception for being widespread or egregious.  
We will briefly note the possible merits of each prong of this 
argument against the circumstances here.  
  
 1.  Egregious Violations of the Fourth Amendment 
We have not had occasion to consider when conduct 
by ICE officials (or anyone acting in a similar role) would 
constitute the kind of egregious violations that could trigger 
the protections endemic in the exclusionary rule and justify 
applying the rule in the civil arena.  We now take this 
opportunity to more precisely define the standard that should 
be used in determining whether unlawful conduct by 
governmental officers rises to the level of an ―egregious‖ 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.   
 
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court cited Rochin v. 
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), as an example of ―egregious 
violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might 
transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the 
probative value of the evidence obtained.‖  Lopez-Mendoza, 
468 U.S. at 1050-51.  In Rochin, three deputy sheriffs forcibly 
entered a home and saw Rochin swallow some capsules 
which were believed to be a controlled substance.  In order to 
recover that evidence, Rochin was taken to a hospital where a 
doctor induced vomiting at the direction of one of the officers 
by inserting a tube into Rochin‘s stomach and pumping a 
chemical into him.  The Supreme Court found that such 
conduct offended even ―hardened sensibilities.‖  Rochin, 342 
U.S. at 172.  It ―shock[ed] the conscience‖ and violated 
Rochin‘s right to due process under the Constitution.  Id. 
 
Rochin was decided before the Fourth Amendment 
was applied to the states through incorporation by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961).  ―Consequently, the Court has not relied on the 
Rochin ‗shocks the conscience‘ standard but has instead 
applied a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis in cases 
that, like Rochin, involved highly intrusive searches or 
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seizures.‖  Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 711 (7th 
Cir. 1987).  Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected the use 
of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s ―shocks the conscience‖ 
standard in Section 1983 claims involving excessive force 
under the Fourth Amendment.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). ―Because different standards attach 
to the various rights, identifying the proper constitutional 
approach is essential.‖  Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel 
Highlands School Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Thus, ―the difference between reviewing [the Government‘s] 
actions under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth 
Amendment or the shocks the conscience standard of the 
Fourteenth Amendment may be determinative.‖  Id.     
 
The jurisprudence that has developed for ―ordinary‖ 
Fourth Amendment violations—where the test is 
―reasonableness‖—is critical to determining whether Fourth 
Amendment violations occurred in the first instance.  
However, a violation must be more than ―unreasonable‖ for it 
to satisfy the higher threshold of an ―egregious‖ Fourth 
Amendment violation under Lopez-Mendoza.  See Gonzalez-
Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d at 1448 (―We cannot determine 
whether the IJ properly excluded the I-213 Form based solely 
on our conclusion that the officers‘ conduct was 
unreasonable.‖); Puc-Ruiz, 629 F.3d at 778 (―Lopez-Mendoza 
requires more than a violation to justify exclusion.‖).  The 
gap between reasonableness and egregious violations has led 
to our sister courts of appeals employing varying approaches 
to determining whether a Fourth Amendment violation is 
egregious.  We consider some of those approaches here.  
 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted 
a test resembling the qualified immunity inquiry into whether 
a constitutional violation was the result of bad faith.  
Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 493.  After establishing that a Fourth 
Amendment violation has occurred, the Ninth Circuit 
considers ―whether the agents committed the violations 
deliberately or by conduct a reasonable officer should have 
known would violate the Constitution.‖  Id.  The test was 
developed in Adamson v. C.I.R., 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 
1984), after analyzing the Janis decision, 428 U.S. 433 
(1976), that the Supreme Court relied on for the weighing of 
interests analysis in Lopez-Mendoza.  The Adamson court 
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determined from ―language in Lopez-Mendoza that deterrence 
is not the only consideration‖ underlying the exclusionary 
rule.  745 F.2d at 545.  ―[I]n addition to deterrence, the 
exclusionary rule serves the vital function of preserving 
judicial integrity.‖  Id.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that if 
―police unreasonably violated the defendant‘s fourth 
amendment rights, the integrity of the courts would be 
implicated.‖  Id. at 546.   
 
Oliva-Ramos‘s petition, however, demonstrates the 
difficulty courts and agencies face in adopting a test that is 
perched on the fulcrum of the good faith of the police.  Oliva-
Ramos has alleged that it was ICE‘s policy to detain 
individuals without reasonable suspicion and to enter homes 
during pre-dawn raids without consent.  He also alleges that 
the officers who carry out these pre-dawn raids are acting 
under the guidance of ICE policy.  Thus, focusing only on 
their good faith would permit conduct that may be objectively 
reasonable based on directives of the Department of 
Homeland Security, but nevertheless result in routine 
invasions of the constitutionally protected privacy rights of 
individuals.
21
 
 
In Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 
2006), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also 
addressed this issue.  There, Almeida-Amaral, who was 17 
years old, walked into a parking lot that was adjacent to a gas 
station in southern Texas.  He was approached by a 
uniformed border patrol agent who stopped him and asked for 
identification.  Almeida-Amaral was arrested when he 
produced a Brazilian passport and made subsequent 
                                              
21
 This analysis must, by its very nature, differ from an 
inquiry into an officer‘s good faith that allows evidence to be 
used at a trial even though it was seized by an overly broad 
warrant if the Government can establish the good faith of the 
officers who relied on the defective warrant. See Mass. v. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 985-87 (1984); United States v. 
Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars 
and Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137, 151 (3d Cir. 2002).  The 
egregious inquiry under Lopez-Mendoza cannot be sanitized 
by the underlying agency policy even if the good faith of the 
immigration officer is established.  
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statements that formed the basis of an I-213 Form and an 
order of deportation.  When removal proceedings were 
instituted against him, Almeida-Amaral argued that his 
passport and statements to the police should not be considered 
because they were obtained upon a warrantless seizure and 
arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
22
 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit began its 
discussion by explicitly adopting the Lopez-Mendoza 
exception applying the exclusionary rule in civil removal 
proceedings.  See id. at 234 (―[W]e now apply it as the law of 
the circuit.‖).  It then held that ―exclusion of evidence is 
appropriate under the rule of Lopez-Mendoza if record 
evidence established either (a) that an egregious violation that 
was fundamentally unfair had occurred, or (b) that the 
violation—regardless of its egregiousness or unfairness—
undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.‖  Id. at 
235.  We accept the test adopted by the Second Circuit with 
slight modification.   
 
The Second Circuit made clear that the probative value 
of the evidence obtained is irrelevant to the inquiry.  We 
agree that the probative value of the evidence obtained cannot 
be part of the calculus.  In Rochin, the capsules that were 
forcibly removed from the defendant‘s stomach were highly 
probative and extraordinarily reliable evidence that he had 
consumed a controlled substance.  Yet, the Supreme Court 
had no problem holding that the evidence must be suppressed 
because of the tactics the police used to extract it.  See 
Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1451.  ―Indeed, Rochin stated in 
no uncertain terms that reliability cannot be the sole 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.‖  Almeida-Amaral, 461 
F.3d at 235 (citing Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173).  However, we 
think it is circular to refer to an ―egregious violation that was 
fundamentally unfair,‖ or one that undermines the reliability 
or the probative value of the evidence ―regardless of its 
egregiousness or unfairness,‖ because the inquiry must 
determine whether an egregious violation has occurred.  We 
therefore conclude that evidence will be the result of an 
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 He also argued that since he was an unaccompanied minor, 
his statement was obtained in violation of applicable 
regulations.  The court did not focus on that claim. 
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egregious violation within the meaning of Lopez-Mendoza, if 
the record evidence established either (a) that a constitutional 
violation that was fundamentally unfair had occurred, or (b) 
that the violation—regardless of its unfairness—undermined 
the reliability of the evidence in dispute.  With that alteration, 
we adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit.  See id. at 235.   
 
The Second Circuit did not discuss further the contours 
of the second prong of its approach—―that the violation-
regardless of its egregiousness or unfairness-undermined the 
reliability of the evidence in dispute‖—because the facts of 
the case did not raise ―doubts about the veracity of the 
evidence obtained as a result of the seizure.‖  Id. at 235.  
Rather, the court focused on when a Fourth Amendment 
violation may be ―fundamentally unfair.‖  First, the court 
emphasized that whether a violation is fundamentally unfair 
depends heavily upon the facts of each case.
23
  In Almeida-
Amaral‘s case, the court found that ―two principles . . . bear 
on whether petitioner suffered an egregious violation of his 
constitutional rights.‖  Id.  The court explained:  
 
First, the egregiousness of a constitutional 
violation cannot be gauged solely on the basis 
of the validity (or invalidity) of the stop, but 
must also be based on the characteristics and 
severity of the offending conduct. Thus, if an 
individual is subjected to a seizure for no reason 
at all, that by itself may constitute an egregious 
violation, but only if the seizure is sufficiently 
severe.  Second, even where the seizure is not 
especially severe, it may nevertheless qualify as 
an egregious violation if the stop was based on 
race (or some other grossly improper 
consideration). 
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 The court explained in a footnote that ―we do not intend to 
give an exhaustive list of what might constitute an egregious 
violation of an individual‘s rights.  We emphasize these 
principles only because they are especially germane to the 
facts and circumstances of the case before us.‖  Almeida-
Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235 n.1. 
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Id.  It added that ―exclusion may well be proper where the 
seizure itself is gross or unreasonable in addition to being 
without a plausible legal ground, e.g., when the initial illegal 
stop is particularly lengthy, there is a show or use of force, 
etc.‖  Id. at 236.  And second, where ―there is evidence that 
the stop was based on race, the violation would be egregious, 
and the exclusionary rule would apply.‖  Id. at 237.   
 
We discern a few guiding principles from Almeida-
Amaral.  First, and most importantly, courts and agencies 
must adopt a flexible case-by-case approach for evaluating 
egregiousness, based on a general set of background 
principles which fulfill the two-part Lopez-Mendoza test.  See 
id. at 235 n.1 (―[W]e do not intend to give an exhaustive list 
of what might constitute an egregious violation of an 
individual‘s rights.‖).  Second, those evaluating the 
egregiousness of the violation should pay close attention to 
the ―characteristics and severity of the offending conduct.‖  
Id. at 235.  As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
noted, ―evidence of any government misconduct by threats, 
coercion or physical abuse‖ might be important 
considerations in evaluating egregiousness.  Kandamar v. 
Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2006).  And the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found evidence of ―physical 
brutality‖ and an ―unreasonable show or use of force‖ 
relevant to the egregiousness inquiry.  Puc-Ruiz, 629 F.3d at 
778-79.  In rejecting the petitioner‘s egregiousness claim, that 
court also noted it was not dealing with ―a case in which 
police officers invaded private property and detained 
individuals with no articulable suspicion whatsoever.‖  Id. at 
779 (emphasis in original). 
 
These cases demonstrate that there is no one-size-fits-
all approach to determining whether a Fourth Amendment 
violation is egregious.  Indeed, the exceptions announced in 
Lopez-Mendoza do not suggest or imply that any strict test-
based approach is appropriate or warranted.  Using this 
formulation of the rule as its guide, on remand, the BIA‘s 
inquiry should include such factors as: whether Oliva-Ramos 
can establish intentional violations of the Fourth Amendment, 
whether the seizure itself was so gross or unreasonable in 
addition to being without a plausible legal ground, (e.g., when 
the initial illegal stop is particularly lengthy, there is an 
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unnecessary and menacing show or use of force, etc.), 
whether improper seizures, illegal entry of homes, or arrests 
occurred under threats, coercion or physical abuse, the extent 
to which the agents reported to unreasonable shows of force, 
and finally, whether any seizures or arrests were based on 
race or perceived ethnicity.  These factors are illustrative of 
the inquiry and not intended as an exhaustive list of factors 
that should always be considered, nor is any one factor 
necessarily determinative of the outcome in every case.  
Rather, the familiar totality of the circumstances must guide 
the inquiry and determine its outcome.  Thus, on remand, the 
BIA (and perhaps the IJ) must meaningfully examine the 
particular facts and circumstances of the ICE agents‘ conduct.  
To the extent that the factors discussed above are relevant, 
they should consider them.
24 
 However, the analysis should 
not be limited to these factors, and Oliva-Ramos is free on 
remand to emphasize any particular characteristics of Clara‘s 
alleged consent, and his seizure and arrest that he believes 
renders the ICE agents‘ conduct egregious.  In turn, the BIA 
(and perhaps, the IJ) must consider both whether the ICE 
agents violated Oliva-Ramos‘s Fourth Amendment rights and 
whether those violations were egregious.   
 
2.  Widespread Violations of the Fourth 
Amendment 
 
To our knowledge, no court has explicitly adopted or 
applied the portion of the Lopez-Mendoza pronouncement 
that ―conclusions concerning the exclusionary rule‘s value 
might change, if there developed good reason to believe that 
Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were 
widespread.‖  468 U.S. at 1050.  Yet it is as much a part of 
the Lopez-Mendoza discussion as ―egregious‖ violations, and 
we cannot ignore it simply because we are forced to write on 
the proverbial ―blank slate.‖  Rather, determining when 
widespread violations of the Fourth Amendment may serve as 
an independent rationale for applying the exclusionary rule in 
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  However, it is important to note—as explained above—the 
inquiry does not turn on the good/bad faith of the agents 
involved.  Rather, this is but one of many circumstances that 
may be relevant in a particular case.   
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civil removal proceedings is simply a matter of first 
impression for us.
25
  Given the discussion in Lopez-Mendoza, 
we think that most constitutional violations that are part of a 
pattern of widespread violations of the Fourth Amendment 
would also satisfy the test for an egregious violation, as 
discussed above. 
 
On other occasions, in a concurring opinion, Justice 
Kennedy has acknowledged that evidence of widespread 
Fourth Amendment violations would raise serious concerns.  
In his concurring opinion in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 
586 (2006), Justice Kennedy explained:  
 
Today‘s decision does not address any 
demonstrated pattern of knock-and-announce 
violations.  If a widespread pattern of violations 
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 Allegations of widespread violations of the Fourth 
Amendment have been presented previously before this Court 
in a different context.  See Argueta v. United States 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement,  643 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 
2011).  There, the plaintiffs brought a Bivens action (allowing 
for damages remedies for constitutional violations by federal 
agents) against various federal and local immigration 
officials, as well as officers who actually participated in raids 
that led to the plaintiffs‘ arrest.  The plaintiffs alleged that 
Operation Return to Sender was being conducted by 
inadequately trained officers who relied on an ‗―outdated and 
inaccurate [database] in up to 50% of cases,‘‖ id. at 64, and 
who engaged in a ‗―practice‘ of unlawful and abusive raids 
[that] flourished as a predictable consequence of the 
‗arbitrary‘ and ‗exponentially-increased quotas‘‖ that drove 
the programmatic abuses.  Id.  The plaintiffs further alleged 
that the predictable ―collateral arrests‖ of persons not targeted 
by the raids were allowed to count toward the inflated quotas 
of arrests that officers were expected to meet and that this 
resulted in a pattern of constitutional abuses that continued 
once the officers ―actually entered the home.‖ Id. at 64-65.  
We did not address the merits of the alleged constitutional 
torts because the only issues before us involved the 
defendants‘ qualified immunity. 
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were shown, and particularly if those violations 
were committed against persons who lacked the 
means or voice to mount an effective protest, 
there would be reason for grave concern.  Even 
then, however, the Court would have to 
acknowledge that extending the remedy of 
exclusion to all the evidence seized following a 
knock-and-announce violation would mean 
revising the requirement of causation that limits 
our discretion in applying the exclusionary rule.   
 
Id. at 604 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
 
Similarly, in United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 
581 (6th Cir. 2005), the court expressed the following view:  
The Supreme Court‘s language in Lopez-
Mendoza—that ―[t]he ‗body‘ or identity of a 
defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil 
proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit 
of an unlawful arrest‖—when taken out of 
context, could be read to suggest that random, 
widespread detentions and questioning of 
suspected aliens would not implicate Fourth 
Amendment rights.  468 U.S. at 1039, 104 S. 
Ct. 3479.  We do not believe, however, that 
Lopez-Mendoza sanctions such a result.  The 
Supreme Court qualified its holding when it 
stated in the last paragraph of Lopez-Mendoza 
that ―we do not deal here with egregious 
violations of Fourth Amendment or other 
liberties that might transgress notions of 
fundamental fairness.‖ 
 
Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d at 587.   
 
Oliva-Ramos alleges that the ICE officers‘ conduct 
here is both egregious and widespread.  If true, the allegations 
here may well illustrate the precise situation that was 
anticipated in Lopez-Mendoza.  Clearly, a single Fourth 
Amendment violation is not sufficient to extend the 
exclusionary rule to civil removal proceedings unless it is also 
egregious.  Not every illegal entry into a home will rise to that 
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level.  But Oliva-Ramos has alleged much more than the 
forcible warrantless entry into a single home.   
It is uncontested that Oliva-Ramos was taken into custody 
during the course of a pre-dawn raid.  Such raids of homes 
have traditionally been viewed with particular opprobrium 
unless the timing is justified by the particular circumstances.  
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A) (―The warrant must 
command the officer to: (ii) execute the warrant during 
daytime [defined as ―the hours between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 
p.m. . . . ,‖ Fed R. Crim. P. 41(a)(2)(B)], unless the judge for 
good cause expressly authorizes execution at another time . . . 
;‖ see also United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 
896, 897 (3d Cir. 1968) (―The time of a police search of an 
occupied family home may be a significant factor in 
determining whether, in a Fourth Amendment sense, the 
search is ‗unreasonable.‘‖). 
 
 Oliva-Ramos has attempted to introduce evidence of a 
consistent pattern of conducting these raids during 
unreasonable hours, such as the 4:30 a.m. raid that occurred 
here.  Oliva-Ramos is trying to support these allegations by 
resorting to documents that were not available when he had 
his hearing before the IJ, but were presented to the BIA for its 
consideration on appeal.  This evidence included ICE 
Memoranda regarding the Fugitive Operations Teams and 
ICE arrest statistics.  It appears from this record the 
documents were not available for the IJ to consider initially 
because they were produced only after Oliva-Ramos litigated 
their disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.  In his 
FOIA request dated October 4, 2007, Oliva-Ramos requested 
―ICE policies, directives, and memoranda regarding collateral 
arrests made at the suspected locations of individuals targeted 
by ICE.‖  Id.  The Government refused to release these 
documents, citing FOIA exemptions.  Id.  As Oliva-Ramos 
notes, the Government‘s withholding of these documents 
impeded Oliva-Ramos‘s ability to present evidence before the 
IJ in the first instance prior to his April 23, 2008 suppression 
hearing. 
 
Oliva-Ramos argues that ICE conceded that it has a 
policy of rounding up everyone in a home, without any 
particularized suspicion, in order to question all of the 
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occupants about their immigration status.
26
  The BIA‘s refusal 
to even consider that evidence was contrary to Lopez-
Mendoza.  By turning a blind eye to that evidence, the BIA 
prevented Oliva-Ramos from potentially demonstrating that 
the circumstances of his seizure fit within the narrow 
exception left open in Lopez-Mendoza.
27
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  In Argueta, the petitioners alleged that the unconstitutional 
pre-dawn raids continued ―until the agents‘ van was filled.‖ 
643 F.3d at 65.  
27
 The Government acknowledges that Oliva-Ramos was 
detained as the result of ―Operation Return to Sender.‖  In 
May 2006, the Government launched this nationwide 
program to capture fugitive aliens using dragnet-like home 
and office raids.  Argueta, 643 F.3d at 63-67.  In a 2009 
report prepared under the guidance of an advisory panel of 
law enforcement professionals, a Cardozo law school clinic 
issued a public study purporting to document ―a suspiciously 
uniform pattern of constitutional violations during ICE 
[Immigration and Customs Enforcement] home raids.  Bess 
Chiu et al., Cardozo Immigration Justice Clinic, Constitution 
on ICE: A Report on Immigration Home Raid Operations 9 
(2009).  Available at 
http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/i
mmigrationlaw-741/IJC_ICE-Home-Raid-
Report%20Updated.pdf.  The report attempted to detail 
―[t]actical pre-dawn or nighttime home entries, conducted by 
heavily armed seven member teams, with residents who often 
do not speak English . . . .‖  Id. at 29. Individuals purportedly 
involved in one such raid alleged routine constitutional 
violations by government officials, which led one 
commentator to state:  ―While any law enforcement entry into 
the home is likely to seem threatening to residents, the 
accounts of ICE enforcement operations indicate that the 
agency uses excessive displays of force. . . . Evidence now 
abounds that officers frequently enter without consent—that 
they threaten or intimidate residents, make misrepresentations 
of authority, push their way through open doors, or simply 
enter without waiting to speak to a resident at all.  With no 
valid warrants, no exigent circumstances, and often no valid 
consent, one major plank of ICE‘s interior enforcement 
efforts depends on routine violations of a core constitutional 
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In attempting to supplement the record and have the 
BIA remand to the IJ for additional proceedings where the 
newly obtained records could be considered, Oliva-Ramos is 
merely asking for an opportunity to present evidence that the 
raid leading to his apprehension falls within the narrow 
exception recognized in Lopez-Mendoza, and that it was 
therefore error to categorically refuse the remedy of 
suppression without affording him an opportunity to establish 
that the Government was engaging in the kind of egregious or 
widespread abuses that justifies suppression under Lopez-
Mendoza.  We do not suggest that these allegations are 
established fact, nor that they would necessarily satisfy Oliva-
Ramos‘s burden under Lopez-Mendoza even if proven.  That 
is for the IJ and BIA to determine in the first instance.  
However, these allegations are woven into the fabric of the 
central issue before us, and cannot properly be resolved 
absent the materials Oliva-Ramos sought to present in the 
removal proceedings. 
  
 We believe the BIA erred in not allowing Oliva-
Ramos an opportunity to support his Fourth Amendment 
claim.  We take no position, however, on the underlying 
question of whether the circumstances here are so egregious 
or widespread as to justify a suppression order.  We merely 
conclude that Oliva-Ramos must be permitted to present 
evidence to support his contention that the Government‘s 
conduct here falls within the exception the Supreme Court 
was careful to allow in Lopez-Mendoza.   
 
D.   Regulatory Violations 
  
 1.  8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) (consent to enter) 
 
 As we summarized above, the IJ and BIA dismissed 
Oliva-Ramos‘s claims because they concluded that Clara 
consented to entry and that Oliva-Ramos could not, therefore, 
establish any Fourth Amendment violation.  However, we 
                                                                                                     
guarantee.‖  Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations & the 
Fourth Amendment: Representing Immigrants Arrested in 
Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 507, 516-18 (2011) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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agree that the BIA failed to apply the proper Fourth 
Amendment inquiry. 
 
 The BIA considered the question in the context of 8 
C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2) which provides:  
 
An immigration officer may not enter into the 
non-public areas of a business, a residence 
including the curtilage of such residence, or a 
farm or other outdoor agricultural operation, 
except as provided in section 287(a)(3) of the 
Act, for the purpose of questioning the 
occupants or employees concerning their right 
to be or remain in the United States unless the 
officer has either a warrant or the consent of the 
owner or other person in control of the site to be 
inspected. When consent to enter is given, the 
immigration officer must note on the officer‘s 
report that consent was given and, if possible, 
by whom consent was given. If the immigration 
officer is denied access to conduct a site 
inspection, a warrant may be obtained.  
 
In affirming the IJ‘s decision that no Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred because the entry was 
consensual, the BIA stated that ―we have considered the 
respondent‘s asserted bases for contending that the consent to 
the officers‘ entry was coerced (or otherwise invalid) but we 
are not persuaded by them.‖  ―Although the BIA ‗is not 
required to ‗write an exegesis‘ on every contention,‘ the 
‗analysis‘ offered here is simply inadequate to afford the 
meaningful review that both‖ Oliva-Ramos and the 
Government deserve.  Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 477 
(3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Mansour v. INS, 230 F.3d 902, 908 
(7th Cir. 2000)). 
 
The Supreme Court has made clear that ―[c]onsent 
must be given voluntarily.‖  Stabile, 633 F.3d at 230 (citing 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968)).  Thus, 
the Court requires a careful examination of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding how that consent was obtained.  
See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002).  
The appropriate inquiry into the voluntariness of a purported 
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consent would include, without limitation: ―the age, 
education, and intelligence of the subject; whether the subject 
was advised of his or her constitutional rights; the length of 
the encounter; the repetition or duration of the questioning; 
and the use of physical punishment.‖  United States v. Price, 
558 F.3d 270, 278 (3d Cir. 2009).  We have also ―identified 
as relevant ‗the setting in which the consent was obtained 
[and] the parties‘ verbal and non-verbal actions.‘‖ Id.  In 
addition, the number of officers and displays of force are 
important factors.  See United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 954 
(3d Cir. 1994).  This kind of particularized scrutiny was not 
applied to the evidence here because it was assumed that the 
Fourth Amendment remedy of suppression did not apply.  
Rather, the Form I-213 that was relied on to establish a 
consensual entry indicated that ―[c]onsent to enter the 
premises was provided by Clara Oliva.‖  That appears to have 
largely been the beginning and the end of the inquiry.  As 
noted above, however, Officer Belluardo did not recall the 
specifics of the entry; she merely testified based upon what 
she said was normal procedure.   
 
The BIA, therefore, erred in finding valid consent 
without analyzing the totality of the circumstances under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Again, we take no position on what the 
outcome of that inquiry should be here.  We only hold that the 
inquiry that appears on this record is not sufficient given the 
nature of Oliva-Ramos‘s claims.  
  
 2.  8 C.F.R. §§ 287.8(b)(1) (seizure) 
 
The BIA correctly noted that 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(1) 
permits an ICE agent, without a warrant, to ―interrogate any 
alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or 
to remain in the United States.‖  8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1).  We 
have made clear, however, that the ―authority under Section 
1357(a)(1) to interrogate a person believed to be an alien is 
limited by the restrictions of the fourth amendment.‖  Babula 
v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 665 F.2d 293, 295 
(3d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).  As we noted in Babula, 
―[s]ince the same standards govern the validity of a seizure 
under section 1357(a)(1) as under the fourth amendment, 
questioning that is permissible under the fourth amendment is 
also permissible under section 1357(a)(1).‖  Id.   
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8 C.F.R. § 287.8 was promulgated pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1).  This regulation incorporates the test that 
―a person has been ‗seized‘ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have 
believed that he was not free to leave.‖  United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).  Specifically, the 
regulation states:  ―An immigration officer, like any other 
person, has the right to ask questions of anyone as long as the 
immigration officer does not restrain the freedom of an 
individual, not under arrest, to walk away.‖  8 C.F.R. § 
287.8(b)(1) (emphasis added).   
In order to conduct a proper analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment, the BIA should have considered among the non-
exclusive list of relevant factors, the circumstances that the 
Supreme Court described in Mendenhall.  The Mendenhall 
Court explained that ―[e]xamples of circumstances that might 
indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to 
leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, 
the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching 
of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of 
voice indicating that compliance with the officer‘s request 
might be compelled.‖ Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.   
 
Although we do not decide whether those factors in 
fact existed, we discuss by way of example some of the 
considerations that could have influenced the Mendenhall 
analysis.  Here, armed ICE officers entered Oliva-Ramos‘s 
room shining flashlights that woke him up at 4:30 in the 
morning.  After he got up, he was told to go to the living 
room where officers blocked several exits and detained his 
family members.  The record also indicates at least six armed 
uniformed ICE officers were present and that certain family 
members were told to sit down when they tried to stand. 
 
In concluding that Oliva-Ramos was not improperly 
seized, the BIA relied exclusively on Oliva-Ramos‘s 
testimony during the suppression hearing that he had no 
intention of leaving the premises because he ―didn‘t commit 
any crime.‖  Yet the question of intent to leave is less relevant 
under the Fourth Amendment than whether he felt free to 
leave.  See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007) 
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(―[T]he Court adopted Justice Stewart‘s touchstone 
[Mendenhall test], but added that when a person ‗has no 
desire to leave‘ for reasons unrelated to the police presence, 
the ‗coercive effect of the encounter‘ can be measured better 
by asking whether ‗a reasonable person would feel free to 
decline the officers‘ requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter.‘‖) (internal citations omitted).  
 
 Mendenhall makes clear that ―circumstances that 
might indicate a seizure‖ may exist ―even where the person 
did not attempt to leave . . . .‖  Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.  
Here, while Oliva-Ramos may not have intended or attempted 
to leave his apartment at 4:30 a.m., the BIA must also inquire 
into whether he felt free to leave.  (Question: ―What would 
have happened if you‘d asked the officers to leave?;‖ 
Response ―I couldn‘t tell the officers to leave because it‘s the 
law and I didn‘t have anything to tell them.‖).  The BIA, 
therefore, erred in rejecting Oliva-Ramos‘s claim of a 
regulatory violation without an adequate inquiry into whether 
Oliva-Ramos was seized before proceeding to find reasonable 
suspicion to detain him.   
 
We caution, however, that nothing in this opinion is 
intended to undermine the ability of immigration officers to 
ask questions of a person to obtain his or her immigration 
status so long as the inquiry is consistent with the limitations 
imposed by the Fourth Amendment.  See Florida v. Bostick, 
501 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1991).  Bostick makes clear that ―even 
when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular 
individual, they may generally ask questions of that 
individual, ask to examine the individual‘s identification, and 
request consent to search . . . as long as the police do not 
convey a message that compliance with their requests is 
required.‖  Id. (internal citations omitted).  ―So long as a 
reasonable person would feel free ‗to disregard the police and 
go about his business,‘ the encounter is consensual and no 
reasonable suspicion is required.‖  Id. at 434 (internal citation 
omitted).  But the encounter ―loses its consensual nature‖ and 
a seizure has occurred ―when the officer, by means of 
physical force or show of authority, has in some way 
restrained the liberty of a citizen . . . .‖  Id.   
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Our discussion of these principles is not intended to 
resolve the merits of Oliva-Ramos‘s Fourth Amendment 
claims.  Rather, we simply explain that the inquiry undertaken 
by the BIA was wrongly guided by its assumption that 
suppression is not permitted in removal proceedings.  Cf. 
Babula, 665 F.2d at 296 (finding reasonable suspicion in the 
context of an automobile stop).  
 
3.  8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i) (warrantless arrest) 
 
We must also consider whether the BIA properly 
construed 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i), which states that ―[a]n 
arrest shall be made only when the designated immigration 
officer has reason to believe that the person to be arrested has 
committed an offense against the United States or is an alien 
illegally in the United States.‖  8 C.F.R. § 287.8 (c)(2)(i).  
Section 287.8(c)(2)(i) emanates from INA § 287(a)(2), 8 
U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).  We held in Babula that ―under section 
1357(a)(2) . . . ‗arrest‘ means an arrest upon probable cause, 
and not simply a detention for purposes of interrogation.‖  
665 F.2d at 298.   
  
 In Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization 
Service, 626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980), a case upon which the 
BIA relied in finding that Oliva-Ramos posed a flight risk, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, in addition to 
the background circumstances of the interrogation, an 
uncoerced admission that a petitioner ―came from Mexico . . . 
constitute[d] a clearly sufficient basis for his warrantless 
arrest.‖  Tejeda-Mata, 626 F.2d at 725.  There, Tejeda-Mata 
drove through a parking lot in Washington when an officer 
―recognized an alien whom he had previously arrested and 
who had been granted voluntary departure.‖  Id. at 723.  After 
the officer parked his car to block Tejeda-Mata, he jumped 
out of the car and asked the officer what was happening.  The 
officer asked where he was from and Tejeda-Mata responded 
that he came from Mexico.   
  
 Here, it should be clear from what we have thus far 
explained that we cannot conclude that any statements related 
to Oliva-Ramos being a flight risk were uncoerced, without 
an examination by the BIA or the IJ in the first instance into 
whether Oliva-Ramos was improperly seized during the home 
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raid and subsequent arrest.  See Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (stating that if evidence is obtained 
as a result of an unlawful seizure, it is to be excluded as the 
―‗fruits‘ of the [officer‘s] unlawful action.‖).  The BIA relied 
solely on a statement contained in the Form I-213 that Oliva-
Ramos posed a flight risk, and thus § 287.8(c)(2)(i) permitted 
a warrantless arrest.  Whether Oliva-Ramos‘s warrantless 
arrest was valid depends upon whether he was illegally 
seized.  Thus, we will vacate the BIA‘s ruling as to regulatory 
violation 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i) and remand for further 
consideration in light of the potential illegal seizure of Oliva-
Ramos. 
  
 4.  8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(vii) (coerced statements) 
 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(vii) prohibits ―[t]he use of 
threats, coercion, or physical abuse by the designated 
immigration officer to induce a suspect to waive his or her 
rights or to make a statement . . . .‖  8 C.F.R. § 
287.8(c)(2)(vii).  The BIA combined its analysis of this 
regulatory provision with the discussion of an improper 
seizure under 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(1).  Based on our 
discussion of the circumstances surrounding the potential  
improper seizure and coercion, we will remand for further 
consideration of 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(vii) and any potential 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.   
  
 5. 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) (right to counsel) 
 
In addition to the regulatory violations discussed 
above, Oliva-Ramos also claims that ICE agents violated 8 
C.F.R. § 292.5(b).  That regulation provides:   
 
Whenever an examination is provided for in this 
chapter, the person involved shall have the right 
to be represented by an attorney or 
representative who shall be permitted to 
examine or cross-examine such person and 
witnesses, to introduce evidence, to make 
objections which shall be stated succinctly and 
entered on the record, and to submit briefs.  
Provided, that nothing in this paragraph shall be 
construed to provide any applicant for 
admission in either primary or secondary 
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inspection the right to representation, unless the 
applicant for admission has become the focus of 
a criminal investigation and has been taken into 
custody. 
 
8 C.F.R. § 292.5.  The BIA rejected Oliva-Ramos‘s challenge 
to this provision, concluding that the Government is only 
required to inform an alien of his right to legal representation 
after he is placed into formal proceedings.  See Samayoa-
Martinez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 897, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2009)).  
We agree with the Board‘s interpretation of § 292.5.  Formal 
removal proceedings begin only after the Government has 
filed a Notice to Appear in immigration court.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
1239.1(a) (―Every removal proceeding conducted under 
section 240 of the Act (8 U.S.C. § 1229a) to determine the 
deportability or inadmissibility of an alien is commenced by 
the filing of a notice to appear with the immigration court.‖).  
Here, although the Government issued its Notice to Appear 
for Oliva-Ramos on March 26, 2007, the notice was not filed 
with the Immigration Court—thus initiating formal 
proceedings—until March 29, 2007.  That Notice to Appear 
also provided a statement informing Oliva-Ramos of his right 
to representation.  Thus we will affirm the BIA as to its ruling 
on § 292.5 because we conclude that Oliva-Ramos was 
notified of his right to counsel before he was placed in formal 
proceedings.
28
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 For the reasons discussed above, we will vacate in part 
and will affirm in part, the BIA‘s August 31, 2010 order, and 
we will remand to the BIA with instructions that it grant the 
motion to reopen the proceedings and that it conduct further 
                                              
28
 We need not consider additional regulatory violations 
reached by the BIA as Oliva-Ramos has not appealed the 
BIA‘s decision as to 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (failure to provide 
―timely‖ advice of rights), 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(a) (examination 
by same officer who arrested respondent), and 8 C.F.R. § 
287.8(d)(1) (conditions of prolonged detention in a van). 
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proceedings (which may include a remand to the IJ) 
consistent with this opinion.
29
   
                                              
29
 The panel notes that Ms. Nikki Reisch argued on behalf of 
Petitioner as an eligible law student pursuant to Local 
Appellate Rule 46.3.  The Court commends her exceptional 
oral advocacy and expresses its gratitude to her and to the 
New York University School of Law and the Washington 
Square Legal Services, Inc. for the pro bono representation 
provided for the Petitioner in this matter. 
